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Abstract
The aim of this piece is to discuss in
what extent one can find – in the works
of Shackle and Davidson – an
understanding of uncertainty capable of
both comprehend the concept of
probable knowledge and admit the
existence of degrees of ‘true uncertainty’.
Sharing the opinion of other scholars
(Runde, 1990; Dow, 1995, and Dequech,
1997), we think that it is possible to find
this definition of uncertainty in Keynes’s
works, and so make a point to the
understanding of uncertainty as a concept
feasible to be graded. Moreover, we claim
that this concept is not incompatible with
the understanding of the social reality as
a nonergodic process. To sustain this
claim, we will discuss Davidson’s and
Shackle’s views and show that in their
writings there are some elements that
support our main point.
Resumo
Oobjetivodestetrabalhoédiscutiremquemedidaé
possível encontrar, nos trabalhos de Davidson e
Shackle, o entendimento da incerteza como um con-
ceito que compreende a existência, tanto de conheci-
mentoprovável,quantodegrausdeincertezafunda-
mental. Partilhando a opinião de outros autores
(Runde, 1990; Dow, 1995; Dequech, 1997), acre-
ditamos ser possível encontrar esta definição de in-
certezanostrabalhosdeKeynese,destaforma,afir-
mar que é possível definir incerteza fundamental
comoumconceitoqueadmitegrausdediferenciação.
Além disto, afirmamos que tal conceito não é in-
compatível com o entendimento da realidade, en-
quanto um processo não-ergódico. Para sustentar
e s t ea r g u m e n t o ,d i s c u t i m o sa sv i s õ e sd eS h a c k l ee
Davidson e mostramos que existem em seus escritos









Classificação JEL B30, B40,
B50.1_ Introduction
The aim of this piece is to discuss in what
extent one can find – in the works of
Shackle and Davidson – an understanding
of uncertainty capable of both
comprehend the concept of probable
knowledge and admit the existence of
degrees of “true uncertainty”. Sharing the
opinion of other scholars (Runde, 1990;
Dow, 1995; and Dequech, 1997), we
think that it is possible to find this
definition of uncertainty in Keynes’s
works, and so make a point to the
understanding of uncertainty as a concept
feasible to be graded. Moreover, we claim
that this concept is not incompatible with
the understanding of the social reality as a
nonergodic process. To sustain this claim,
we will discuss Davidson’s and Shackle’s
views and show that in their writings
there are some elements that support
our main point.
2_ Degrees of Keynesian
uncertainty
During the last decade, some authors
have argued that it is possible
to develop a concept of degrees
of uncertainty in a Keynesian sense.
These authors (Runde, 1990; Dow,
1996; Dequech, 1997; Crocco, 1998;
and 2000) based their contributions on
Keynes’s theory of probability (Keynes,
CW. VIII), especially on the definition
of weight of argument.
Keynes’s main concern in
discussing probability is to show that
one can act rationally in situations
where complete certainty about the
future is absent. In these situations, one
should look not only at the probability
relation1 but also at the size of the
evidence – evidential spread – that
support this probability. Here, Keynes
brings into discussion the concept of
weight of argument.
Weight will be defined as the degree
of completeness of the information set on which a
probability is based.2 According to Runde
(1991, p. 281), this is expressed, as:
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1 For Keynes, probability is
about logical relations
between sets of propositions,
premisses and conclusions.
Let the conclusions be the set
of propositions a,a n dt h es e t
of premisses, h.I fa
knowledge of h justifies a
rational belief in a of some
degree, one can say that
there is a probability
relation between a and h.
This relation can be







2 Runde (1991) argues that
three definitions of weight can
be found in the Treatise.
In this paper, we have
adopted the one
that, according to the
author’s views, is
more comprehensive.
For a discussion of









where: K r istherelevantknowledgeand;
I r is the relevant ignorance.
Two aspects deserve more
attention. The first one is related to
the meaning of “relevant ignorance.”
As insightfully pointed out by Runde
(1991), it is always possible to know,
or at least identify, the factors that
affect our probability relation, and
about which one is ignorant.
Secondly, due to the role of relevant
ignorance, an increase in the amount
of evidence does not necessary
implies an increase in the weight.
New evidence could decrease the
weight if it implies the increase of
relevant ignorance. A new piece of
evidence can show that our previous
relevant knowledge was wrong –
decreasing the weight – albeit,
simultaneously, the knowledge of
relevant ignorance is increasing.
Finally, it is well known that
Keynes assumes a direct relationship
between weight and confidence in using
the probability estimate as a guide to
conduct. From the discussion above, it
is possible to see that the definition of
weight as a degree of completeness of
information is much more appropriate to
the understanding of this relationship.
Confidence can either decrease or
increase, for the reason that new
evidence can increase the relevant
ignorance or knowledge.
The concept of weight of
argument has been used to
demonstrate that Keynesian
uncertainty admits of degrees. In this
discussion, the weight of argument is
viewed as a measure of the degree of
uncertainty. As it was shown above,
the concept of weight as a degree of
completeness of information appears to be
the best one to capture the role of
ignorance in the assessment of
confidence in the probability relation.
As a consequence of this approach, a
complete absence of probable knowledge
should be interpreted as the extreme
case of uncertainty. If it is impossible
to establish a probability relation,
whatever the reason – nonexistence of
probability or lack of skill to determine
or identify it –, it is also impossible the
existence of any confidence.T h u s ,t h i s
situation could be interpreted as an
extreme case not only for uncertainty
but also for confidence.
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can move to situations where
uncertainty prevails due to low weight
of argument, which implies low
confidence. Therefore, there is a qualitative
change in uncertainty: from a situation
in which a probability relation does not
e x i s tt oas i t u a t i o ni nw h i c ha
probability relation exists but the weight
is low. Moreover, as the weight of
argument is increasing, confidence
follows in the same direction and
uncertainty decreases. In this approach,
a probable knowledge is taken into
account as a guide to conduct, and the
degree of reliability of this probable
knowledge – the confidence it merits –
determines the degree of uncertainty that
exists in a specific situation. So the
concept of weight allows the
understanding of uncertainty as a
relative concept.
In the Keynesian literature about
uncertainty, there are numerous
references to the concept of
“nonergodicity” to justify an
interpretation of uncertainty as a rigid
concept that cannot be graded
(Davidson, 1982-1983, 1993, 1995).
Shackle’s discussion about crucial
decisions or unique experiments has
been widely used to justify the
nonergodicity of the economic
environment. In the next section, we
will show that the existence of degrees
of uncertainty does not contradict an
understanding of the world as a
nonergodic system. Indeed, we will
show that, even in Shackle’s and
Davidson’s writings, it is possible to
find elements supporting this argument.
3_ Degrees of uncertainty
and crucial decisions
The concept of knowledge for Shackle
is fundamental to the understanding of
his work. For Shackle, knowledge is
directly related to certainty. Where there
is knowledge, there must be certainty.
This position is expressed in many
passages, as for example:
Knowledge would not deserve that
name if it gave us several conflicting
accounts and answered our question
‘What will follow if I do this’? in
more than one way. [...] Knowledge
must consist in a statement which is
unique (Shackle, 1970, p. 106).
If knowledge means certainty,
where there is uncertainty there is no
knowledge. These situations will appear,
according to Shackle, in circumstances
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apply. An empty decision is the mere
account of a formal solution to a formal
problem. It is a situation in which a
person has a complete and certain
knowledge about all possible choices
and all possible outcomes of each
choice. It is a mechanical and inevitable
action (Shackle, 1959, p. 291).
When one looks at Shackle’s
definition of “decision”, one realises
that empty decisions are not true
“decisions” in his account. He argues
for an understanding of “decision” as a
c o m m i t m e n tt ot h ef i r s ts t e pi na n
action of choosing among a plurality of
rival and mutually exclusive hypotheses
about which it is impossible to know
the relevant consequences (Shackle,
1958, p. 35). Obviously, this is far from
a situation of complete knowledge and
deterministic actions as in the case of
empty decisions.
By contrast, the crucial,
(nonempty) decision implies the
impossibility of repetition of the
decision process
because its very performance
destroys forever the conditions
in which it was undertaken,
which form an essential part of it
(Shackle, 1970, p. 109).
I ti sau n i q u ed e c i s i o nt h a t
brings new information “which agents
will need to take into account in the
future courses of action” (Andrade,
1997, p. 13). Some examples of crucial
decisions are investment, accumulation
of wealth, and finance. In Shackle’s
view, when crucial decisions such as
these are made, there is no knowledge.
If a decision is a process of
commitment by the decision maker with
an action-scheme whose outcome is
unknown, the question that should be
raised is about the process in which such
a decision is made. Here, Shackle
introduces his concept of expectation.
According to him, the decision maker is
concerned with the consequences of his
choice in the future. As the outcome is
not known beforehand, he has to resort
to imagination to figure what will be the
possible outcomes. It is the enjoyment or
satisfaction provided by these outcomes
that will guide the choice of the
decision-maker. However, Shackle argues
that there is a distinction between free or
pure imagination and what he calls
expectations. In Shackle’s words:
There are of course pleasures to be had
from mere day-dreaming, but
they are of a different sort from
those of expectation. These latter
Marco Crocco 15
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anticipation. When we speak of
what the decision-maker can
visualise, we mean what he can
anticipate, that is what he can
imagine without a sense of unrealism
(Shackle, 1958, p. 42).3
Nevertheless, based in this
concept of expectations, how are
decisions made? This question brings
into account another important
contribution of Shackle, that is, his
concept of potential surprise. The latter
can be explained as follows.
Between a feeling of certainty that a
given event will happen (or some
p a r t i c u l a ra n s w e rt oag i v e nq u e s t i o n
t u r no u tt ob et h et r u t h ) ,a n da
feeling of certainty that it will not,
there seems to be a continuous
range of different levels at which
our degree of belief can stand
(Shackle, 1943, p. 101).
This degree of belief is measured
by an operation by which the decision
-maker asks himself how much
“intensity of shock or surprise” he
would feel if, without there having
been any change in the knowledge
available to him on which he based
his belief in it, he were to learn
that this belief is mistaken …
The measure so obtained is what we
may call the potential surprise
associated … with a given hypothesis
(Shackle, 1943, p. 101).
So, there is a direct relationship
between the degree of belief in one
possible outcome and its potential
surprise value. The higher the degree of
belief, the higher the potential surprise.
It is clear that the concept of potential
surprise is directly related to novelty.
What makes the degree of potential
surprise differ among different
hypotheses is the possibility of
emergence of new and special factors,
of which there is no evidence at the
present for the decision-maker. Thus
surprise means that the individual’s
structure of expectations either contains
a misjudgement or has been
incomplete.
To conclude our discussion of
Shackle’s approach to the decision
process, it is necessary to bring into the
framework the concept of the
attention-arresting power of the
hypotheses. The impossibility of feeling
certain about one future outcome –
meaning the impossibility of feeling that
a particular unique result will be attained
in the future – does not imply that the
decision maker does not desire a
nova Economia_Belo Horizonte_12 (2)_11-28_julho-dezembro de 2002
The concept of degrees of uncertainty in Keynes, Schackle, and Davidson 16
3 Elsewhere, Shackle uses this
limitation to the imagination of
the decision maker to define
“decision” as a “choice in face
of bounded uncertainty”
(Shackle, 1959, p. 293).unique focus for his imagination, that is
to say, that he will not centre his hopes
on one particular level of success
(Shackle, 1943, p. 103).
The real incentive for choosing an
action is the enjoyment of anticipating a
high level of success (attention-arresting
power).4 The intensity of enjoyment is a
decreasing function of the degree of
potential surprise and increasing
function of the outcome.
The combination of the potential
surprise and the attention-arresting
power, produces what Shackle calls
focus-values. These will be the best
(focus-gain) and the worst (focus-loss)
outcomes that concern the decision
maker. Comparing these focus-values,
he will assess the attractiveness of his
course of action in a comparison with
others. They provide a clear-cut and
simple basis of comparison between




The technical definition of ergodicity
classifies a system as ergodic if the
stochastic process is such that time and
space averages will coincide for infinite
realisations.5 If the realisations of a
stochastic process are infinite in number,
space and time averages tend to converge.
As a consequence, if the process is
ergodic, the data obtained from past
realisations can provide a useful (safe)
guide to decisions about the future
(Davidson, 1982-1983, p. 185). Thus
economic systems governed by an ergodic
process show timeless (ahistoric) and
immutable relationships. Accordingly, if
the averages do not tend to converge, the
system is classified as nonergodic.
The concept of ergodicity is used
by Davidson (1995) to classify theories
in economics. He argues that economic
theories could be classified into two
groups according to their understanding
of the process that governs reality:
i.immutable reality, meaning the
theories which assume that the
world works as an ergodic
system and;
ii.mutable reality, where a world is
conceived as a nonergodic
system. This taxonomy implies
different ontologies.
Those theories classified in the
first group admit, implicitly or explicitly,
that reliable information can always be
supplied by the present and the past.
They differ regarding how much, if any,
reliable information about the
Marco Crocco 17
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4 The similarity between this
concept and the concept of
animal spirits in Keynes is clear.
5 In Davidson’s words:
“Space averages refer to a
fixed time point and are
formed as averages over the
universe of realisations …
Time averages … refer to a
fixed realisation and are
formed as averages over an
indefinite time space”
(Davidson, 1982-1983, p. 185).immutable reality can be obtained by
agents in the short run. According to
this criterion, ergodic theories can be
subclassified into two types: those
which claim that in the short run, “the
future is known or at least knowable”;
and those which claim that
i nt h es h o r tr u n ,t h ef u t u r ei sn o t
completely known due to some limitation
in human information processing and
computing power (Davidson, 1995, p. 109).
Thus the main difference is
epistemological. For the first subgroup,
there is no uncertainty, while for the
second subgroup uncertainty is due to a
failure in the acquisition of information.
In both cases, uncertainty is
epistemological, not ontological.6
Using the concept of ergodic
systems, Davidson defines uncertainty,
in both the short and long run, as the
absence of governing ergodic processes.
What the above theories claim as
uncertainty is, in fact, risk. If reality is
immutable (ergodic), then the matter is
to find a way to collect information
from past events and make them
available to the decision maker.
Moreover, if the environment is
ergodic, all possible future outcomes
are known in advance. However, he
correctly claims that, in economic life,
this kind of situation is very rare, and
important economic events operate in a
nonergodic reality.
One of the main factors that
makes economic events nonergodic is
Shackle’s crucial, (nonempty) decision.
As shown before, crucial, (nonempty)
decisions are unique in that they cannot
be repeated. Uncertainty applies to
situations of nonergodicity, and in these
cases, no data can be used as a reliable
guide to the future.
Decision-makers in these situations
believe that no relevant information
exists today that can be used as a basis
for scientifically predicting future events




_the post-1974 writings of Sir
John Hicks and;
_G .L .S .S h a c k l e ’ sc r u c i a l
experiment analysis.
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6 Davidson classifies the
following theories as ergodic:
Type 1 – Classical perfect
certainty models; actuarial
certainty equivalents, such as
rational expectations model;
New Classical models; and
some New Keynesian
theories. Type 2 – Simon’s
bounded rationality; Savage’s
expected utility theory; New
Keynesian models such as
asymmetric information and
co-ordination failure theories;
and Austrian theory.The concept of nonergodicity is
used by Davidson to strongly deny any
kind of degree of uncertainty.
Knowledge, for Davidson, is defined as
the inverse of uncertainty.7 Nonergodic
processes are, in Davidson’s account,
those situations where there is
uncertainty; where such situations
predominate, knowledge is completely
absent and uncertainty, absolute. As
there is no place for more or less
knowledge in these cases, Davidson
concludes that there is no case for more
or less uncertainty.
The agent’s behaviour is
described as follows: first, decision
makers have to recognise what kind of
environment they are dealing with.
The problem facing every economic
decision maker is to guess whether (a)
the phenomenon involved is currently
being governed by distribution
functions which are sufficiently time
invariant as to be presumed ergodic
– at least for the relevant future or;
(b) nonergodic circumstances are involved
(Davidson 1987, p. 148).
If the latter is the case, sensible
economic agents
try to form sensible expectations
which rely on the existence of social
institutions that have evolved (e. g.
contracts and money) to permit
humans to cope with the unknowable
(Davidson, 1993, p. 149).
Questions arising from the above
view are: how can sensible agents be
defined? Is it proper to define
k n o w l e d g ei ns u c had u a l i s t i cw a y ?
5_ A critique of Shackle’s
unknowledge and Davidson’s
approaches
As we have seen above, Davidson’s
approach is founded on Shackle’s
concept of crucial decisions to justify
the existence of nonergodicity in
economic life. What will be argued here
does not deny the existence of crucial
decisions as one of the determinants of
nonergodicity, but rather it claims that
it is possible to find, in Shackle’s work
elements to justify the existence of
degrees of uncertainty, and then to
show that the latter is compatible with
nonergodicity. To do this, it is necessary
to scrutinise the concept of knowledge
used by Shackle to demonstrate that it
is in itself contradictory to the concept
of potential surprise. By revising this
concept of knowledge, and thus by
making it conform to the concept of
potential surprise, it is possible to argue
Marco Crocco 19
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7 He is very explicit
about this matter: “Once
technical definitions
of the concept of uncertainty
and its inverse, knowledge,… ”
and “knowledge’s inverse,
the concept of uncertainty
regarding real world future
events…” (Davidson,
1987, p. 147).in favour of the existence of degrees of
uncertainty. Finally, we return to
Davidson’s work to demonstrate that it
is also possible to accept the concepts
of crucial decision and nonergodicity
together with the idea of degrees of
uncertainty.
An assessment of Shackle’s view
must start with the recognition of his
most important contribution, which is
the concept of crucial decision. It is
fundamental for the understanding of
the effects of uncertainty in the decision
process. As shown before, it implies that
the person concerned cannot exclude from
his mind the possibility that the very act
of performing the experiment may
destroy forever the circumstances
in which the choice is made
(Shackle, 1990 [1956], p. 6).
It is a creative action.
However, two points in Shackle’s
framework deserve further comments.
First, as pointed out by Andrade (1997,
p. 15), there is an “extreme form of
methodological individualism
underlying his subjectivism”. The
individual appears to behave and to
reason as if he is alone in the world.
The social relations that he is involved
in do not affect his choices, and these
a r ep e r f o r m e do n l yb yt a k i n gi n t o
consideration what is in the mind of the
economic agent.
Second, Shackle has a very
restricted and contradictory concept of
knowledge. He has a dualistic8 approach:
“Where there is knowledge there is not
uncertainty”, and accordingly where
there is no knowledge there is
uncertainty. Therefore, knowledge is
only conceivable in situations of
complete certainty.
However, when he defines
expectations, he imposes limits on the
imagination process that the decision
maker goes through to anticipate some
possible outcomes. He explicitly says
that expectation is “what he (the decision
maker) can imagine without a sense of
u n r e a l i s m ” .Y e t ,t od e f i n ew h a ti s
possible or not in this sense implies the
acknowledgement that the decision
maker must have some knowledge about
what is unrealistic and what is not.
This definition of “expectation”
contradicts his definition of knowledge,
as shown above. The main point here is
that Shackle differentiates between
imagination and knowledge. Although
he argues that an individual – when
making his expectations, must constrain
h i si m a g e si nt w ow a y s–
making them in the first place
compatible with the individual’s beliefs
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8 According to Dow (1996,
p. 16), “Dualism is the
propensity to classify
concepts, statements and
events according to duals,
belonging to only one of two
all-encompassing
mutually-exclusive categories
with fixed meanings: true or
false, logical or illogical,
positive or normative, fact or
opinion, and so on.”about the nature of things and about
human nature, so that they represent
something that seems to him possible in
abstract (Shackle, 1959, p. 288).
And in the second place trying to
anticipate what possible transformation
could happen in future,9 he does not
accept an individual’s belief as a kind of
knowledge.
However, how can a decision
maker define what can be possible or
not in a situation of complete lack of
knowledge? As Shackle said in his
article of 1959, one can only avoid a
choice in the face of chaos and anarchy
if one has some knowledge about what
is possible or not.10
Indeed, Shackle uses the
expression bounded uncertainty to define
decision. Here, again, when he uses the
adjective bounded to qualify
uncertainty, he contradicts his
definition of uncertainty as
unknowledge. If between a situation of
certainty, which means knowledge, and
a situation of uncertainty meaning
unknowledge, there is a situation of
bounded uncertainty, then this latter must
imply bounded or partial knowledge.
Moreover, the discussion of
potential surprise reveals this
contradiction. To construct the
potential surprise curve, one has to
measure the intensity of shock or
surprise of an unexpected outcome. In
doing so, one has to imagine the
hypothetical outcomes and compare
them in terms ofsurprise. This should be
done, using Shackle’s words,
without there having been any change in
the knowledge available to him on which
he based his belief in it (1943, p. 101).
Nevertheless, if knowledge for
Shackle means, as shown before, “a
statement which is unique” – i. e.
certainty – there is only one possible
outcome and any other should be
regarded as impossible. From this point
of view, there is no basis to ascribe
different degrees of surprise to
impossible outcomes. Thus, the
construction of the potential surprise
curve must imply a concept of
knowledge that does not denote
certainty. This conclusion could be
reinforced with the analysis of the
concept of attention-arresting power.
Remember that, according to Shackle,
the real incentive for choosing an action
is the enjoyment of anticipating a high level
of success. Two factors are the
determinants of the intensity of
enjoyment: the degree of potential
surprise (inversely related) and the
Marco Crocco 21
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9 “…attaching then to
named future dates and
restricting them to such
transformations of his existing
situation as seem to him
possible in the time-span
between ‘now’ and ‘then’”
(Shackle, 1959, p. 288).
10 In Shackle’s words: … for a
man who thought that any act
could have any sequel
whatever, and that there was
no possibility of excluding
anything as incapable of
following from any stated
course of action, would
believe any one act just as
eligible, just as wise and
efficient, as any other …
(Shackle, 1959, p. 293).expected outcome (positively related). As
one can see, this enjoyment is related to
factors that necessarily involve some
kind of knowledge. In the same sense as
the discussion about the degree of
potential surprise, the determination of
expected outcome must imply the
existence of degrees of uncertainty.
To conclude, the contradiction
between Shackle’s concept of
knowledge and his potential surprise
curve can be eliminated if one replaces
the concept of knowledge as certainty
with the concept of probable
knowledge that appears in Keynes’s
Treatise. In doing so, one must admit
that Shackle’s work is compatible with
the concept of degrees of uncertainty.
Very similar conclusions can be
derived from an assessment of
Davidson’s contributions. As noted
before, Davidson’s approach is
grounded on Shackle’s works to sustain
his concepts of nonergodicity and
absence of knowledge, as defining
features of uncertainty. Two aspects will
be analysed here: the sources of
ergodicity and their implication for the
knowledge possessed by the decision
maker and the concept of knowledge
used by Davidson. Let us look at the
first aspect.
Davidson claims that an
important element that makes the
economic world nonergodic is the role
played by technical change. In his words,
To restrict entrepreneurship to robot
decision-making via Bayes’ theorem, …,
is to provide a descriptive analogy of
modern real world economies which
ignores the role of the Schumpeterian
entrepreneur – the creator of
technological revolutions and change
(Davidson, 1982-1983, p. 193).
However, as we have shown
elsewhere (Crocco, 1999, 2000), while
innovation guarantees the
nonergodicity of the world, it does
not necessarily imply complete
ignorance about patterns of technical




approach to technical change (Dosi,
1982) can be used to show that, at any
moment in time, there is always a
technological paradigm that
determines the features of innovative
activity for every sector of the
economy, imposing a selective, precise and
ordered pattern of technological change.T h e
pattern of technical change will be
disorderly only in situations
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technological paradigm.
It must be made clear that what
has been claimed here is not that the
outcome of the innovative process
can be perfectly forecast, but rather
that there is an ordered pattern of
change originating from the
introduction of an innovation. This
feature of innovative activity allows
the emergence of a kind of knowledge
that is not complete or certain, but
that can be used to guide the decision
maker. In other words, there is a
probable knowledge in the innovative
activity that is not contradictory
of the nonergodicity feature
of this activity.
The second aspect to be analysed
is Davidson’s definition of knowledge.
We think that the above discussion
shows that, in order to restrict
uncertainty to unknowledge, it is
necessary to use a narrow definition of
knowledge. If one understands
imagination as a process in which
previous knowledge is employed, one
must be open to conceive that
uncertainty and knowledge can exist
in gradations.
It is interesting to take a look at
the debate between Davidson and
Runde (1993), as it reveals a
contradiction in Davidson’s approach
which is similar to the contradiction
in Shackle’s approach. Runde (1993)
argues that Davidson has two
positions when he discusses
uncertainty: official and unofficial.
The main point of the official
position is the relationship between
knowledge and ergodicity. Ergodicity
is a precondition for the existence of
knowledge, and as ergodicity is a
f e a t u r eo fs o m ea s p e c t so ft h ew o r l d ,
it is an ontological precondition. In
Runde’s words:
Davidson’s official position thus
consists of an epistemological
dichotomy between knowledge and
uncertainty and a corresponding
ontological opposition between ergodic
and nonergodic processes
(Runde, 1993, p. 384).
The consequence of this concept
of knowledge is that the dualistic
approach, knowledge on the one side
and uncertainty on the other, does not
give space for sensible expectations.T h i s
dichotomy implies that either
expectations exist because one has
knowledge (ergodic systems), or no
expectations can be asserted as no
knowledge exists. Sensible expectations,a s
Marco Crocco 23
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category, which is (fallible) probable
knowledge.11
Davidson’s reply is not sufficient
to invalidate Runde’s point. Davidson
denies that he accepts empirical
regularities as criteria for science. His
denial of the prevalence of ergodic
processes is used to justify his
nonacceptance of this approach.
Indeed, he argues that empirical realism:
...is neither a necessary or a sufficient
condition for ‘science’.
T h ep r i m a r yg o a lo fs c i e n c ei st o
explain. If one can also predict
on the basis of ‘empirical regularities’,
then that is icing on the scientific
cake. Scientists, however, should
‘know’ in what areas they cannot
search for past empirical regularities
to predict the future. In these
nonergodic areas of economic science,
human beings can and should
develop ‘certain important
(institutional) factors which
somewhat mitigate in practice the
effect of our ignorance of the future’
(Davidson, 1993, p. 431).
However, from the quotation
above, it is possible to see that
Davidson stopped halfway. The
logical consequence of the acceptance
that economic science and human
beings can and do develop
institutions is that some kind of
knowledge must be derived from the
development of institutions. Likewise,
as institutions exist to deal with
nonergodic situations, some kind of
knowledge could exist in nonergodic
processes.
Davidson’s account of the
process of sensible expectations
formation is also problematic.
Davidson argues that the decision
maker makes two sequential steps to
form expectations. The first one is to
guess whether a specific event is
ergodic. After that, if the guess
(belief) is that the event is
nonergodic, the agent looks for the
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treating knowledge as one pole




different kinds of knowledge. I
would go along with Davidson
on the kind of truth and
certainty guaranteed by sound
ap r i o r ireasoning, for example,
and ignore the question of
whether or not the standard
axioms of logic and rules of
inference are themselves not to
some extent arbitrary. But our
knowledge of the ‘facts’ of
science or history is a different
thing entirely, resting as it does
on a shaky base of observation,
perception, and inference. By
adopting a conception of
relative or probable knowledge,
Davidson could accommodate
this difference, namely, that
knowledge based on
experience is fallible, whereas
the knowledge arrived at by
sound reasoning (and assuming
the truth of the premisses or
axioms) is not” (Runde, 1993,
p. 395, n. 14).existence of social institutions on
which to base his sensible
expectations. It is as if the decision
maker and social structure were
independent. However, as pointed out
by Lawson (1997, p. 83) the
social structure is the, typically
unacknowledged, condition of all our
a c t i o n sa sw e l la st h e ,u s u a l l y
unintended, consequence.
T h e r ei sn ot w o - s t e ps e q u e n c e
in the decision process. The decision
maker is interacting with the social
structure before asking whether an
event is ergodic or not. In Runde’s
(1993, p. 390) words:
Social structures thus not only permit
and facilitate human agency, but
presuppose it.
The main point here is that the
acknowledgement of the nonergodic
process is not a distinctive process
separated from the acknowledgement
of the institutions that exist to deal
with it this nonergodic process.
Institutions exist before the decision
maker forms his expectations and they
are reproduced through this
engagement with them. They are an
antecedent element in the process of
forming expectations and, in some
degree, they shape those expectations.
The important question is about the
stability and endurability of these
institutions.12 If, in the eyes of the
agent, they are stable and endurable, he
can – despite the nonergodicity – have
a probable knowledge about the future
course of events and feel himself less
uncertain about the future. As
Andrade has pointed out,
Complexity and the passage of time
make us ignorant or uncertain about
many relevant current and future events
that take place in our environment.
However, there is a form of
(incomplete) knowledge in the existing
system of rules and conventions
(Andrade, 1998, p. 132).
Summing up, crucial decisions
and nonergodicity should not be
considered as features of the economic
process that make it impossible to
discern degrees of uncertainty. The
prevalence of crucial decisions and
nonergodic processes not only do not
vitiate the existence of a concept of
probable knowledge, but also supply
the basis for claiming that there is a
continuum of degree of uncertainty
inherent in these processes.
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12 A similar point is made by
Lewis and Runde (1999). In
this work they analyse the
possible connections between
Davidson’s work and the critical
realist (Lawson 1997)
perspective, which is implicitly
adopted in this paper.6_ Conclusion
We have tried in this paper to show that
in order to understand uncertainty as a
concept feasible to the market, it is
necessary to take into account not
only the discussion about the weight
of argument, but also the analysis
about what constitutes relevance.
Moreover, we tried to show that the
concept of degree of uncertainty is an
intrinsic element of both Shackle’s and
Davidson’s works. They themselves
d on o tr e c o g n i s ei tb u t ,a sw eh a v e
tried to show before, it is necessary to
understand the concept of potential
surprise in Shackle and sensible agents
in Davidson.
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